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Abstract
We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting
problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the cor-
responding maximization (sup) problems non recursive. Our approach
consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian. Under standard general
conditions, there is a recursive saddle-point (infsup) functional equation
(analogous to a Bellman equation) that characterizes the recursive solu-
tion to the planner's problem and forward-looking constraints. Our ap-
proach has been applied to a large class of dynamic contractual problems,
such as contracts with limited enforcement, optimal policy design with
implementability constraints, and dynamic political economy models.
1 Introduction
Recursive methods have become a basic tool for the study of dynamic economic
models. For example, Stokey, et al. (1989) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)
describe a large number of macroeconomic models that can be analysed using
recursive methods. A main advantage of this approach is that it characterizes
optimal decisions { at any time t { as time-invariant functions of a small set of
state variables. In engineering systems, knowledge of the available technology
and of the current state is enough to decide the optimal control, since current
returns and the feasible set depend only on past and current predetermined
variables. In this case the value of future states is assessed by the value function
This is a substantially revised version of previously circulated papers with the same title
(e.g. Marcet and Marimon 1998 & 1999). We would like to thank Fernando Alvarez, Truman
Bewley, Edward Green, Robert Lucas, Andreu Mas-Colell, Fabrizio Perri, Edward Prescott,
Victor Rios-Rull, Thomas Sargent, Robert Townsend and Jan Werner for comments on earlier
developments of this work, all the graduate students who have struggled through a theory in
progress and, in particular, Matthias Mesner and Nicola Pavoni for pointing out a problem
overlooked in previous versions. Support from MCyT-MEyC of Spain, CIRIT, Generalitat de
Catalunya and the hospitality of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis is acknowledged.
1and, under standard dynamic programming assumptions, the Bellman equation
is satised and a standard recursive formulation is obtained.
However, one key assumption to obtain the Bellman equation is that future
choices do not constrain the set of today's feasible choices. Unfortunately, this
assumption does not hold in many interesting economic problems. For example,
in contracting problems where agents are subject to intertemporal participation,
or other intertemporal incentive constraints, the future development of the con-
tract determines the feasible action today. Similarly, in models of optimal pol-
icy design agents' reactions to government policies are taken as constraints and,
therefore, future actions limit the set of current feasible actions available to the
government. Many dynamic games { for example, dynamic political-economy
models { share the same feature that an agent's current feasible actions depend
on functions of future actions.
In general, in the presence of forward-looking constraints { as in rational
expectations models where agents commit to contracts subject to incentive con-
straints (e.g. commitment may be limited) { optimal plans, or contracts, do not
satisfy the Bellman equation and the solution is not recursive in the standard
sense. In this paper we provide an integrated approach for a recursive formu-
lation of a large class of dynamic models with forward-looking constraints by
reformulating them as equivalent recursive saddle-point problems.
Our approach has a wide range of applications. In fact, it has already proved
to be useful in the study of very many models1. Just to mention a few exam-
ples: growth and business cycles with possible default (Marcet and Marimon
(1992), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Cooley, et al. (2004)); social insurance (At-
tanasio and Rios-Rull (2000)); optimal scal and monetary policy design with
incomplete markets (Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Sepp al a (2002), Svensson
and Williams (2008)), and political-economy models (Acemoglu, Golosov and
Tsyvinskii (2011)). For brevity, however, we do not present further applications
here and limit the presentation of the theory to the case of full information.
We build on traditional tools of economic analysis such as duality theory
of optimization, xed point theory, and dynamic programming. We proceed in
three steps. We rst study the planner's problem with incentive constraints
(PP) as an innite-dimensional maximization problem, and we embed this
problem in a more general class of planner's problems (PP); these problems
are parameterized by the weight () of a (Benthamite) social welfare function,
which accounts for the functions appearing in the constraints with future con-
trols (forward-looking constraints). The objective function of PP is similar to
Pareto-optimal problems where  is the vector of weights given to the dierent
innitely-lived agents in the economy.
Second, we consider the Lagrangean which incorporates the forward-looking
constraints of the rst period, which denes our starting saddle-point planner's
problem (SPP) and we prove a duality result between this saddle-point prob-
lem and the planner's problem (PP). This construction helps to characterize
1As we write this version google scholar reports that the working paper has been cited 290
times, many of these citations are applications of the method.
2the `non-recursivity problem'and provides a key step towards its resolution.
As it is well known, the solution of dynamic models with forward-looking
constraints is, in general, time-inconsistent, in the following sense: if at some
period t > 0 the agent solves PP for the whole future path given the state vari-
ables found at t; the agent will not choose the path that he had chosen in period
zero (unless, of course, the forward-looking constraints are not binding, up to
period t). This `non-recursivity problem'problem is at the root of the diculties
in expressing the optimal solution with a time-invariant policy function.
A key insight of our approach is to show that there is a modied problem
PP0 such that if the agent reoptimizes this problem at t = 1 for a certain 0;
the solution from period t = 1 onwards is the same that had been prescribed
by PP from the standpoint of period zero. The key is to choose the weights
0 appropriately. We show that the appropriate 0 is given by the lagrange
multipliers of SPP in period zero. This procedure of sequentially connect-
ing saddle-point problems is well dened and it is recursive when solutions are
unique. The problem PP0 can be thought of as the`continuation problem'that
needs to be solved each period in order to implement the constrained-ecient
solution. It supports our claim that the recursive formulation is obtained by in-
troducing the vector , summarizing the evolution of the Lagrange multipliers,
as co-state variable in a time-invariant policy function. As a result, with our
method it is easy to guarantee existence of the solution to PP0 for any 0  0;
making the practical implementation of this method not more complicated than
standard dynamic programming problems.
Third, we extend dynamic programming theory to show that the sequence
of modied saddle-point problems (SPPt) satises a saddle-point functional
equation (SPFE; a saddle-point Bellman equation) and, conversely, that policies
obtained from solving the saddle-point functional equation (SPFE) provide a
solution to the original SPP and, therefore, to the PP problem. This latter
suciency result is very general; in particular, it does not rely on convexity
assumptions. This is important because incentive constraints do not have a
convex structure in many applications. However, this result is limited in that
we assume (local) uniqueness of solutions. We discuss the role this assumption
plays and, in particular, we show how our approach, and results, do not depend
on this assumption.
In addition, we also show how standard dynamic programming results, based
on a contraction mapping theorem, generalize to our saddle-point functional
equation (SPFE). An immediate consequence of these results is that one can
use standard computational techniques that have been used to solve dynamic
programming problems { such as solution of rst-order-conditions for a given
recursive structure of the policy function, or value function iteration { to solve
dynamic saddle-point problems. Not only the computational techniques needed
but also our assumptions are standard in dynamic economic models.
Our approach is related to other existing approaches that study dynamic
models with expectations constraints, in particular to the pioneering works of
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990), Green (1987) and Thomas and Worrall
(1988), and the applications that have followed. We briey discuss how these,
3and other, works relate to ours in Section 6, after presenting the main body
of the theory in Sections 4 and 5. Section 2 provides a basic introduction to
our approach and Section 3 a couple of canonical examples (most proofs are
contained in the Appendix).
2 Formulating contracts as recursive saddle-point
problems
In this section we give an outline of our approach, leaving the technical details
and proofs for sections 4 and 5. Our interest is to solve problems that have the
following representation:
PP sup
fat;xtg
E0
1 X
t=0

tr(xt; at; st) (1)
s.t. xt+1 = `(xt; at; st+1); p(xt;at; st)  0; t  0 (2)
Et
Nj+1 X
n=1

nh
j
0(xt+n; at+n; st+n) + h
j
1(xt; at; st)  0; j = 1;:::l; t  0
(3)
x0 = x; s0 = s;
at is measurable with respect to (:::;st 1;st):
where r;`;p;h0;h1 are known functions, ;x;s known constants, fstg
1
t=0 an
exogenous stochastic Markov process, Nj = 1 for j = 0;:::;k; and Nj = 0 for
j = k + 1;:::;l.
Standard dynamic programming methods only consider constraints of form
(2) (see, for example, Stokey, et al. (1989) and Cooley, (1995)). Constraints
of form (3) are not a special case of (2), since they involve expected values
of future variables2. We know from Kydland and Prescott (1977) that, under
these constraints, the usual Bellman equation is not satised, the solution is
not, in general, of the form at = f(xt;st) for all t, and the whole history of
past shocks st can matter for today's optimal decision. By letting Nj = 1
PP covers a large class of problems where discounted present values enter the
implementability constraint. For example, long term contracts with intertem-
poral participation constraints take this form.3 Alternatively, by letting Nj = 0
PP covers problems where intertemporal reactions of agents must be taken
into account. For example, dynamic Ramsey problems, where the government
2One might think that expressing (3) in the form v(xt;st)    (xt;st)  0, where v is the
discounted sum Et
P1
n=0 nh0(xt+n; at+n; st+n);xt;at;st) and   = h1   h0 converts (3)
into (2). But this does not solve the problem since v is not known a priori.
3Combining (2) and (3) accounts for a broad class of constraints. For example, a nonlinear
participation constraint of the form g(Et
P1
n=0 nh(xt+n; at+n; st+n);xt;at;st)  0 can
easily be incorporated in our framework with one constraint of the form (2), g(wt;xt;at;st) 
0 (with control variables (wt;at)), and one of the form (3), Et
P1
n=0 nh(xt+n; at+n; st+n)
= wt.
4chooses policy variables subject to optimal dynamic behavior by the agents in
the economy, have this form4. Even though we focus on the two canonical cases
Nj = 1 and Nj = 0, intermediate cases can be easily incorporated. It is then
without loss of generality that we let Nj = 1, for j = 0;:::;k; and Nj = 0 for
j = k + 1;:::;l.
A rst step of our approach is to consider a more general class of problems,
parameterized by :
PP sup
fat;xtg
E0
l X
j=0
Nj X
t=0

tjh
j
0(xt; at; st)
s.t. xt+1 = `(xt; at; st+1); p(xt;at; st)  0; (4)
Et
Nj+1 X
n=1

nh
j
0(xt+n; at+n; st+n) + h
j
1(xt; at; st)  0; t  0; (5)
x0 = x; s0 = s (6)
and at is measurable with respect to (:::;st 1;st):
The main dierence with PP is that in PP we have incorporated the h
j
0
functions of the forward-looking constraints (3) into the objective function. Also,
the superindex j now starts from j = 0; with h0
0;, to account for the reward
function of the original problem. More precisely, if we let h0
0 = r, we set
 = (1;0;:::;0) and we choose a very large h0
1 to guarantee that (5) is never
binding for j = 0, PP is the original PP. Furthermore, it should also be
noticed that the value function of this problem, when well dened { say, V(x; s)
{ is homogeneous of degree one in ; a property that our approach exploits (and
the reason for collecting in the objective function the original return function r
of PP, together with the forward-looking elements of the constraints).
Notice that PP is an innite-dimensional maximization problem which,
under relatively standard assumptions, is guaranteed to have a solution for
arbitrary   0: The solution is a plan5 a  fatgt=0, where at(:::;st 1;st) is a
state-contingent action (Proposition 1).
An intermediate step in our approach is to transform program PP into a
saddle-point problem in the following way. Consider writing the Lagrangean for
PP when a lagrange multiplier  2 Rl+1 is attached to the forward-looking
constraints only in period t = 0 and the remaining constraints for t > 0 are left
4See Section 6 for references to related work using constraints of the form Nj = 1 and
Nj = 0.
5We use the bold notation to denote sequences of measurable functions.
5as constraints. The Lagrangean then is
L(a;;) = E0
l X
j=0
Nj X
t=0

tjh
j
0(xt; at; st) + (7)
l X
j=0
j
0
@E0
Nj+1 X
t=1

th
j
0(xt; at; st) + h
j
1(x0; a0; s0)
1
A : (8)
If we nd a saddle-point of L subject to (4) for all t  0 and (5) for all t  1,
the usual equivalences between this saddle-point and the optimal allocation of
PP can be exploited. Using simple algebra it is easy to show that L can be
rewritten as the objective function in the following saddle point problem6:
SPP inf
2R
l+1
+
sup
fat;xtg
h0(x0; a0; s0) + h1(x0; a0; s0)
+  E0
l X
j=0
'j(; )
Nj X
t=0

t h
j
0(xt+1; at+1; st+1) (9)
s.t. xt+1 = `(xt; at; st+1); p(xt;at; st)  0; t  0
Et
Nj+1 X
n=1

nh
j
0(xt+n; at+n; st+n) + h
j
1(xt; at; st)  0; j = 0;:::;l; t  1
for initial conditions x0 = 0 and s0 = s; where ' is dened as
'j(; )  j + j if Nj = 1; i.e. j = 0;:::;k
 j if Nj = 0; i.e. j = k + 1;:::;l:
The usefulness of SPP comes from the fact that its objective function has a
very special form: the term inside the expectation in (9) is precisely the objective
function of PP'(;) given the states (x
1;s1): This will allow us to show that
if (fa
tg1
t=0;) solves SPP for initial conditions (x;s) then fa
t+1g1
t=0 solves
PP'(;) given initial conditions (x
1;s1), where x
1 = `(x0; a
0; s1). That is,
the continuation problem that needs to be solved in the next period is precisely
a planner problem where the weights have been shifted according to ':
We then show that, under fairly general conditions, solutions to PP are
solutions to SPP (Theorem 1), and viceversa (Theorem 2). Also, the usual
slackness conditions will guarantee that if (fa
tg;) solves SPP
E0
l X
j=0
j
2
4
Nj+1 X
t=1

th
j
0(x
t; a
t; st) + h
j
1(x; a
0; s)
3
5 = 0; (10)
so that the values achieved by the objective functions of SPP and PP coin-
cide.
6We use the notation h0(x;a;s) 
Pl
j=0 jh
j
0(x;a;s):
6If PP were a standard dynamic programming problem (i.e. without (5)),
then the following Bellman equation would be satised:
V(x;s) = sup
a
fh0(x; a; s) +  E[V(`(x; a; s0);s0) j s]g (11)
s.t. p(x;a; s)  0:
The reason that the Bellman equation holds is that in standard dynamic
programming if PP is reoptimized at period t = 1 given initial conditions
(x
1;s1); the reoptimization simply conrms the choice that had been previously
made for t  1: However, with forward-looking constraints (5) this Bellman
equation is not satised, the reason being that if the problem is reoptimized at
t = 1 the choice will violate the forward looking constraint of period t = 0; if (5)
is binding at t = 0. A central element of our approach is that, as suggested by the
objective function of SPP; if the solution is reoptimized in period t = 1 with
the new weights 0 = '(; ) { that is, if in period one the reoptimization is
for the problem PP0; { the result conrms the solution of the original problem
PP. This allows the construction of a recursive formulation of our original
PP problem where the value function with modied weights is included in the
right-hand side of a functional `Bellman-like'equation to capture the terms in
(9). More specically, we show that under fairly general assumptions solutions
to SPP obey a saddle-point functional equation (SPFE). More specically,
we look for functions W that satisfy the following
SPFE W(x; ; s) = inf
0
sup
a
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[W(x0; 0; s0)js]g
s.t. x0 = `(x; a; s0); p(x;a; s)  0
and 0 = '(; );
and we show that this holds for W(x; ; s) = V(x;s) (Theorem 3).
We only consider problems where the infsup problem has unique optimal
choices.7 In this case optimal allocations and multipliers are uniquely deter-
mined and there is a policy function  ; i.e. (a; ) =  (x;;s) associated
with a value function W satisfying SPFE. Finally we show that the following
recursive formulation
(a
t; 
t) =  (x
t;
t;st)

t+1 = '(
t; 
t)
gives the optimal policy we are seeking. More precisely, we rst show that, given
fa
t;
tg generated by   for initial conditions (x;;s), (fa
tg1
t=0;
0)solves SPP
in state (x; s), that (fa
tg1
t=1;
1) solves SPP
1 in state (x
1; s1), etc. (Theorem
4). As a result, the path fa
tg for 0 = (1;0;:::0) is a solution to PP.
In this sense, the modied problem PP is the `correct continuation problem'
to the planners' problem: if  is properly updated, the solution can be found
each period by re-optimizing PP
t.
7We discuss this issue in more detail in Sections 4 and 5.
72.1 The Principle of Optimality with forward-looking con-
straints
Our central result is not a simple restatement of the standard dynamic program-
ming principle of optimality to our saddle-point formulation8. This principle
says (when there are no forward-looking constraints)9: if V satises the Bell-
man equation (11), evaluated at (x;s)), it is the (sup) value of PP, when
the initial state is (x; s), and a sequence fa
tg1
t=1 solves PP if and only if it
satises:
V(x
t;st) = h0(x
t; a
t; s) + E

V(x
t+1;st+1)jst

x
t+1 = `(x
t; a
t; st+1); x
t = x:
In our context, under standard assumptions it is true that if fa
tg1
t=1 solves PP
when the initial state is (x;s) and attains the value V(x;s), then W(x; ; s) 
V(x;s) and
W(x
t;
t;st) = 
th0(x
t;a
t;st) + 
th1(x
t;a
t;st) +  E

W(x
t+1;
t+1;st+1)jst

(12)
x
t+1 = `(x
t; a
t; st+1); x
t = x

t+1 = '(
t; 
t); 
0 = (1;0;:::;0);
where f
tg1
t=1 is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the se-
quence of SPP (Theorems 1 and 3).
However, the converse, suciency, theorem that if W(x; ; s) satises SPFE
and (fa
tg1
t=1;f
tg1
t=1) satises (12) then V(x;s)  W(x; ; s) is the value of
PP and fa
tg1
t=1 solves PP is true if, in addition, W(x; ; s) = !(x; ; s)
and
!j(x
t; 
t; st) = h
j
0(x
t; a
t; st) +  E

!j(x
t+1; 
t+1; st+1)jst

, (13)
if j = 0;:::;k; and
!j(x
t; 
t; st) = h
j
0(x
t; 
t; st) if j = k + 1;:::;l: (14)
These recursive equations for the forward-looking constraints are needed to
guarantee that these constraints are also satised in the original PP: Notice
that if W(x; ; s) is dierentiable in  then, by Euler's Theorem, W(x; ; s) =
!(x; ; s) (where !j  @jW) and equations (13) and (14) follow from the
Envelope Theorem. We show, and use, the fact that if fa
tg1
t=1 is unique (at
least locally unique) then W(x; ; s) is dierentiable in  and, therefore, we
recover the Principle of Optimality for our saddle-point formulation (Theo-
8This subsection claries our approach and what is new with respect of our previous work;
it can be skipped by the reader only interested in how our approach works and on our main
results.
9See, for example, Stokey et al (1989).
8rems 4 and 5), without having to impose equations (13) and (14) as `promise-
keeping'constraints10.
Before we turn to these results in Sections 4 and 5, in the next Section we
show how our approach is implemented in a couple of canonical examples.
3 Two Examples
In this Section we illustrate our approach with two examples. In the rst, there
are only intertemporal participation constraints so it is a case when Nj = 1 (i.e.
k = l); in the second, there are only intertemporal one-period (Euler) constraints
hence it is a case with Nj = 0 (i.e. k = 0). The rst is similar to the model
studied in Marcet and Marimon (1992), Kocherlakota (1996), Kehoe and Perri
(2002), among others, and it is canonical of models with intertemporal default
constraints; the second is based on the model studied by Aiyagari et al. (2002)
and it is a canonical model with Euler constraints, as in Ramsey equilibria of
optimal scal and monetary policy.
3.1 Intertemporal participation constraints.
We consider, as an example, a model of a partnership, where several agents
can share their individual risks and jointly invest in a project which can not
be undertaken by single (or subgroups of) agents. Formally, there is a single
good and J innitely-lived consumers. Preferences of agent j are represented by
E0
P1
t=0 
t u(c
j
t); u is assumed to be bounded, strictly concave and monotone,
with u(0) = 0; c represents individual consumption. Agent j receives an endow-
ment of consumption good y
j
t at time t and, given a realization of the vector yt
agent j has an outside option that delivers total utility va
j(yt) if he leaves the
contract in period t; where va
j is some known function: It is often assumed that
the outside option is the autarkic solution: va
j(yt) = E
hP1
n=0 
n u(y
j
t+n) j y
j
t
i
,
which implicitly assumes that if agent j defaults in period t he is permanently
excluded from the partnership and he does not have any claims on the produc-
tion and the capital of the partnership in, and after, period t.
Total production is given by F(k;), and it can be split into consumption c
and investment i: The stock of capital k depreciates at the rate : The joint pro-
cess ft;ytg1
t=0 is assumed to be Markovian and the initial conditions (k0;0;y0)
are given. The planner looks for pareto optimal allocations that ensure that no
agent ever leaves the contract. Letting Yt =
PJ
j=1 y
j
t > 0 the planner's problem
10In our previous work (Marcet and Marimon (1998, 1999)) we assumed uniqueness of
solutions and used the fact that the contraction mapping guarantees the uniqueness of the
value function. Messner and Pavoni (2004) showed how the principle of optimality could fail
in our context when solutions are not unique. The missing element being the recursivity of the
forward-looking constraints. The above statement of the principle of optimality for problems
with forward-llooking constraints and, correspondingly, our suciency theorems address this
issue, which we further discuss in Section 6.
9takes the form:
PP max
fct;itg
E0
1 X
t=0

t
J X
j=1
j u(c
j
t)
s.t. kt+1 = (1   )kt + it;
F(kt;t) + Yt  
0
@
J X
j=1
c
j
t + it
1
A  0; and
Et
1 X
n=0

n u(c
j
t+n)  va
j(yt) for all j;t  0:
It is easy to map this planner's problem into our PP formulation. Let
s  (;y); x  k; a  (i;c); `(x; a; s)  (1   )k + i; p(x; a; s)  F(k;) +
P
j2J yj  
P
j2J cj + i

; r(x; a; s) 
PJ
j=1 j u(cj); h
j
0(x; a; s)  u(cj);
h
j
1(x; a; s)  u(cj) va
j(yt); j = 1;:::;J: Problems PP and SPP are obtained
mechanically insuring that (5) is not binding for j = 0.
Finally we obtain the recursive formulation that we are seeking. SPFE
takes the form11
W(k; ;y;) = inf
0
sup
c;i
f
J X
j=1
(0j + j) u(cj) + j  
u(cj)   va
j(y)

+  E

W(k0; 0;y0;
0)jy;

g
s.t. k0 = (1   )k + i; F(k;) +
J X
j=1
yj  
0
@
J X
j=1
cj + i
1
A  0
and 0 =  + :
We know that W(k; ;y;) = V(k;y;) solves this functional equation. Let-
ting   be the policy function associated with this functional equation and W,
solutions to PP satisfy
(c
t;i
t;
t) =  (k
t; 
t; t; yt)

t+1 = 
t + 
t
with initial conditions (k0;0; 0; y0); where 0 = (1;0;:::;0):
The planner would obtain the full commitment solution (subject to intertem-
poral participation constraints) from period t onwards if in period t = 1 he
solved PP
1 given initial conditions (k
1;1; y1); provided that the weights 
of the agents were adjusted according to 
1: Co-state variables 
t become the
additional weight that the planner should assign to each agent above the initial
weight j if the planner reoptimizes in period one. The variable t is all that
needs to be remembered from the past.
11Here we incorporate the knowledge that 0 = 0.
10This recursive formulation allows easy computation of solutions using either
rst-order-conditions or value function iteration. It also helps in characterizing
the solution to the optimal problem: the weights 
t evolve according to whether
or not their participation constraints are binding. Every time that the partici-
pation constraint for an agent is binding, his weight is increased permanently by
the amount of the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. An agent is induced not
to default by increasing his consumption permanently, not only in the period
where he is tempted to default, but smoothly over time.
Due to these changing weights relative marginal utilities across agents are
not constant when participation constraints are binding, since the rst-order-
conditions imply
u0(ci
t)
u0(c
j
t)
=
j + 
j
t+1
i + i
t+1
; for all i;j and t:
It follows that individual paths of consumption depend on individual histories
(in particular, on past `temptations to default') not just on the initial wealth
distribution and the aggregate consumption path, as in the Arrow-Debreu com-
petitive allocations, but that this dependence on the past is completely sum-
marized by t (and, by homogeneity, the weightsj + 
j
t+1 can be normalized
to add up to one). This also shows that if enforcement constraints are never
binding (e.g., punishments are severe enough) then t = 0 and we recover the
\constancy of the marginal utility of expenditure", and the \constant propor-
tionality between individual consumptions," given by u0(ci
t)=u0(c
j
t) = j=i: In
other words, the evolution of the co-state variables can also be interpreted as
the evolution of the distribution of wealth. If intertemporal participation con-
straints are binding innitely often there may be a non-degenerate distribution
of consumption in the long-run; in contrast with an economy where intertem-
poral participation constraints cease to be binding, as in an economy with full
enforcement.12
The evolution of the weights  also helps to characterize the decision for
capital: the intertemporal Euler equation of SPP is given by:
i
t+1u0(ci
t) =  Et

i
t+2u0(ci
t+1)
 
Fkt+1 + (1   )

;
That is, the `stochastic discount factor', u0(ci
t+1)=u0(ci
t) is distorted by
 
1 + i
t+1=i
t+1

,
a distortion which does not vanish unless the non-negative process

i
t
	
con-
verges to zero.
3.2 Intertemporal one-period constraints, A ramsey prob-
lem
We present an abridged version of the optimal taxation problem studied by
Aiyagari at al. (2002). A representative consumer solves
12See, for example, Broer (2009) for a characterization of the non-degenerate stationary
distribution of consumption, in a similar model with nite number of types and a continuum
of agents of each type.
11max
fct;et;bt+1g
E0
1 X
t=0

t [u(ct) + v(et)]
s.t. ct + bt+1pb
t = et(1   t) + bt
bt+1  B; b0 given;
where c is consumption and e is eort (e.g. hours worked). The government
must nance exogenous random expenditures g issuing debt and collecting taxes.
Feasible allocations satisfy ct+gt = et: The budget of the government mirrors the
budget of the representative agent. For convenience we assume the government
can not get too much in debt due to a constraint bt+1  B. In a competitive
equilibrium, the following intertemporal and intratemporal equations must be
satised (provided bt+1 > B):
pb
tu0(ct) =  Etu0(ct+1)
 
v0(et)
u0(ct)
= 1   t:
In a Ramsey equilibrium the government chooses sequences of taxes and
debt that maximize the utility of the consumer subject to allocations being a
competitive equilibrium allocations. Substituting the above equilibrium equa-
tions into the budget constraint of the consumer the Ramsey equilibrium can
be found by solving
PP max
fct;bt+1g
E0
1 X
t=0

t [u(ct) + v(et)]
s.t. Et [bt+1u0(ct+1)]= u0(ct)(bt   ct) etv0(et) (15)
bt+1  B; b0 given;
where et = ct + gt is left implicit. This problem can be represented as a
special case of PP by letting: s  g; x  b; a  (c; b0); p(x;a; s)  b0  
B; `(x;a; s0)  b0; r(x; a; s)  u(c) + v(e), h1
0(x; a; s)  bu0(c); h1
1(x; a; s) 
u0(c)(b   c) ev0(e). Problems PP and SPP are then easily dened.
Finally we obtain the recursive formulation that we are seeking. In its orig-
inal notation, SPFE takes the form13
W(b; ;g) = inf
10
sup
c;i
f0 [u(ct) + v(et)] + 1bu0(c)
+ 1 [u0(c)(b   c) ev0(e)] +  E[W(b0; 0; g0)jg ]g
s.t. b0  B; 00 = 0; 10 = 1
13Here we incorporate the knowledge that 0 = 0.
12Letting   be the policy function associated with this functional equation,
ecient allocations satisfy
(c
t;b
t+1;1
t ) =  (b
t; 
t; gt)
for 
t+1 = (1;1
t ) with initial conditions (b0;0; g0), where 0 = (1;0):
It is clear that in this case the only element of  that matters is the lagrange
multiplier t 1: The planner would obtain the full commitment solution from
period t onwards if in period t = 1 he solved PP
1 given initial conditions
(b
1;g1);; tat is, if the objective function would be modied to include the term
1
0b1 u0(c1) in addition to the consumer's discounted utility from t = 1 onwards.
This term captures the commitment to enforcing the Euler equation (15) at
t = 0.
This recursive formulation allows easy computation of solutions using either
rst-order-conditions or value function iteration. It also helps in characterizing
the solution to the optimal problem. The rst-order-conditions of the Ramsey
problem imply that solutions satisfy
Et

(1
t   1
t+1)u0(ct+1)

= 0: (16)
As discussed in Aiyagari et al. (2002), with incomplete markets, this implies
that


1;t
	
is a non-negative submartingale. Lagrange multipliers modify the
weight given to debt relative to the complete markets case. The optimal policy
now can be understood as forcing the planner in each period to modify the
deadweight loss of taxation with weight 
t 1:
4 The relationship between PP, SPP, and SPFE
This section proves the relationships between the initial maximization problem
PP, the saddle-point problem SPP and the saddle-point functional equation
SPFE discussed in the previous Sections. We rst describe the basic structure
of the problems being considered.
4.1 Basic Structure
There exist an exogenous stochastic process fstg1
t=0, st 2 S, dened on the
probability space (S1;S;P). As usual, st denotes a history (s0;:::;st) 2 St and
St the -algebra of events of st; while fstg1
t=0 2 S1, with S the correspond-
ing -algebra. An action in period t, history st, is denoted by at(st), where
at(st) 2 A  Rm; when there is no confusion, it is simply denoted by at. Given
st and the endogenous state xt 2 X  Rn; an action at is (technologically)
feasible if p(xt;at;st)  0. If the latter feasibility condition is satised, the en-
dogenous state evolves according to xt+1 = `(xt; at; st+1): Plans, a = fatg
1
t=0,
are elements of A = fa : 8t  0; at : St ! A and at 2 Lm
1(St;St;P); g,
where Lm
1(St;St;P) denotes the space of m-valued, essentially bounded, St-
measurable functions. The corresponding endogenous state variables are ele-
ments of X = fx : 8t  0; xt 2 L
n
1(St;St;P)g.
13Given initial conditions (x;s); a plan a 2 A and the corresponding x 2 X,
the evaluation of such plan in PP is given by
f(x;:s)(a) = E0
k X
j=0
Nj X
t=0

tjh
j
0(xt; at; st)
We can describe the forward-looking constraints by dening g : A ! L
k+1
1
coordinatewise as
g(a)
j
t = Et
2
4
Nj+1 X
n=1

nh
j
0(xt+n; at+n; st+n)
3
5 + h
j
1(xt; at; st)
Given initial conditions (x;s); the corresponding feasible set of plans is then
B(x;s) = fa 2 A : p(xt;at; st)  0; g(a) t  0, x 2 X ;
xt+1 = `(xt; at; st+1) for all t  0; given (x0;s0) = (x;s)g:
Then PP can be written in compact form as
PP sup
a2B(x;s)
f(x;:s)(a)
We denote solutions to this problem as a and the corresponding sequence
of state variables x: When the solution exists we dene the value function of
PP as
V(x;s) = f(x;:s)(a) (17)
Similarly, we can also write SPP in a compact form, by dening
B0(x;s) = fa 2 A : p(xt;at; st)  0, g(a) t+1  0; x 2 X
xt+1 = `(xt; at; st+1) for all t  0; given (x0;s0) = (x;s)g:
SPP inf
2Rl
+
sup
a2B0(x;s)

f(x;;:s)(a) + g(a)0
	
Note that B0 only diers from B in that the forward-looking constraints in
period zero g(a) 0  0 are not included as a condition in the set B0, instead
these constraints form part of the objective function of SPP.
4.2 Assumptions and existence of solutions to PP
We consider the following set of assumptions:
A1. st takes values on a set S  RK. fstg1
t=0 is a Markovian stochastic process
dened on the probability space (S1;S;P).
A2. (a) X  Rn and A is a closed subset of Rm. (b) The functions p :
X AS ! R and ` : X AS ! X are measurable and continuous.
14A3. Given (x;s);there exist constants B > 0 and ' 2 (0;
 1); such that if
p(x;a;s)  0 and x0 = `(x; a;s0); then kak  B kxk and kx0k  'kxk
A4. The functions h
j
i(; ; s); i = 0;1; j = 0;:::;l; are continuous and uniformly
bounded, and  2 (0;1):
A5. The function `(; ;s) is linear and the function p(; ;s) is concave. X and
A are convex sets.
A6. The functions h
j
i(; ; s); i = 0;1; j = 0;:::;l; are concave.
A6s. In addition to A6, the functions h
j
0(x; ; s);j = 0;:::;l; are strictly con-
cave.
A7. For all (x; s); there exists a program fe ang
1
n=0 ; with initial conditions (x;s);
which satises the inequality constraints (4) and (5) with strict inequality.
Assumptions A1 and A2 are part of our basic structure, described in the
previous sub-section. These assumptions, together with A3-A4, are standard
and we treat them as our basic assumptions. Assumptions A5-A7 are often
made but they are not satised in some interesting models; however, these
assumptions are only used in some of the results below. For example, the
concavity assumptions A5-A6 are not needed for many results, and assumption
A7 is a standard interiority assumption, only needed to guarantee the existence
of Lagrange multipliers.
The following proposition gives sucient conditions for a maximum to exist
for any . The aim is not to have the most general existence theorem14, but
to stress that one can nd fairly general conditions under which PP has a
solution for any ; which will be crucial in the discussion of how our approach
compares with that of Abreu Pearce and Stachetti, since this ensures that the
continuation problem (namely PP'(;)) is well dened for any .
Proposition 1. Assume A1-A6 and that the set of possible exogenous states
S is countable. Fix (x;;s) 2 XR
l+1
+ S: Assume there exists a feasible
plan e a 2 B(x;s) such that f(;x;s)(e a) >  1. Then there exists a program
a which solves PP with initial conditions x0 = x; s0 = s:
Furthermore, if A6s is also satised then the solution is (almost sure) unique.
Proof: See Appendix.
4.3 The relationship between PP and SPP
The following result says that a solution to the maximum problem is also a solu-
tion to the saddle point problem. It follows from standard theory of constrained
optimization in linear vector spaces (see, for example, Luenberger (1969, Sec-
tion 8.3, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). As in the standard theory, convexity and
14For example, not requiring A6 or the countability of S, which will require additional
assumptions.
15concavity assumptions (A5 to A6), as well as an interiority assumption (A7)
are necessary in order to obtain the result.
Theorem 1 (PP =) SPP). Assume A1-A7 and x  2 R
l+1
+ . Let a be
a solution to PP with initial conditions (x;s):There exists a  2 Rl
+
such that (a;) is a solution to SPP with initial conditions (x;s).
Furthermore, the value of SPP is the same as the value of PP; more pre-
cisely
V(x;s) = f(x;;:s)(a) + g(a)0 (18)
Proof: It is an immediate application of Theorem 1 (8.3) in Luenberger
(1969), p. 217.
The following is a theorem on the suciency of a saddle point for a maximum.
Theorem 2 (SPP =) PP). Given any (x; ; s) 2 XR
l+1
+ S; let (a; )
be a solution to SPP for initial conditions (x;s). Then a is a solution
to PP for initial conditions (x; s):
Furthermore, the value of the two programs is the same and (18) holds.
Notice that Theorem 2 is a suciency theorem `almost free of assumptions.'
All that is needed is the basic structure of section 4.1 dening the corresponding
innite-dimensional optimization and saddle-point problems together with the
assumption that a solution to SPP exists. Once these conditions are satised
assumptions A2 to A7 are not needed.
Proof: The following proof is an adaptation, to SPP, of a suciency theo-
rem for Lagrangian saddle points (see, for example, Luenberger (1969),
Theorem 8.4.2, p.221).
If (a; ) solves SPP; minimality of implies that, for every   0;
(  + )g(a)0  g(a)0;
therefore, g(a) 0  0; but since a 2 B0(x;s), it follows that a 2 B(x;s);
i.e. a is a feasible program for PP: Furthermore, the minimality of 
implies that
g(a)0  0g(a)0 = 0
but since   0 and g(a)0  0, it follows that g(a)0 = 0: Now,
suppose there exist ~ a 2 B(x;s) satisfying f(x;;s)(~ a) > f(x;;s)(a); then,
since g(~ a)0  0; it must be that
f(x;;s)(~ a) + g(~ a)0 > f(x;;s)(a) + g(a)0
which contradicts the maximality of a for SPP.
Finally, using g(a)0 = 0; we have f(x;;s)(a) + g(a)0 = V(x;s) 
164.4 The relationship between SPP, and SPFE
Recall that a function W : XR
l+1
+ S ! R satises SPFE at (x; ; s) when
W(x; ; s) = min
0
max
a2A
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[W(x0; 0; s0)js]g
(19)
s.t. x0 = `(x; a; s); p(x;a; s)  0 (20)
and 0 = '(; ): (21)
In (19) we have substituted inf sup by minmax, implicitely assuming that a
solution to the saddle point problem exists, in which case the value, W(x; ;
s), is uniquely determined15. In other words, the right side of SPFE is well
dened for all (x;;s) and W for which a saddle point exists.
We say that W satises SPFE if it satises SPFE at any possible state
(x;;s) 2 X  R
l+1
+  S: Given W;we dene the saddle-point policy correspon-
dence (SP policy correspondence) 	 : X  R
l+1
+  S ! A  R
l+1
+ by
	W(x; ; s) =

(a;) : a 2 arg max
a2A; x02X
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[W(x0; 0; s0)js]
for 0 = '(; ) and (20);
 2 argmin
0
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[W(x0; 0; s0)js];
for x0 = `(x; a; s) and (21)g
If 	W is single valued, we denote it by  W, and we call it a saddle-point policy
function (SP policy function).
We dene the function W(x;;s)  V(x;s): The following theorem says
that W satises SPFE.
Theorem 3 (SPP =) SPFE). Assume that SPP has a solution for any
(x;;s) 2 X  R
l+1
+  S, then W satises SPFE: Furthermore, letting
(a; ) be a solution to SPP at (x;s); we have (a
0;) 2 	W (x; ; s):
As in Theorem 2, Theorem 3 is also a theorem `almost free of assumptions,'
once the underlying structure and the existence of a well dened solution to
SPP at all possible (x;;s) is assumed.
Proof: By theorem 2, we have that whenever SPP has a solution W is well
dened. Then, we rst prove that, for any given (x;;s), if (a; ) solves
SPP at (x;s) the following recursive equation is satised:
W(x;;s) = h0(x; a
0; s)+h1(x; a
0; s)+ E[W(x
1; '(; ); s0)js]
(22)
15See Lemma 3A in Appendix B.
17To prove  in (22) we write
W(x;;s) = f(x;;s)(a) + g(a)0
= h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s)
+E
2
4
l X
j=0
'j(; )
Nj X
t=0

t h
j
0(x
t+1; a
t+1; st+1) j s
3
5
= h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s) + E

f(x
1;'(;);s1)(a)js

 h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s) + E

V'(;)(x
1;s1)js

= h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s) + E[W(x
1;'(; ;s))js]
where a is the original optimal sequence shifted one period; formally,
letting the shift operator  : St+1 ! St be given by (st) = (s1;s2:::;st),
we dene the St+1-measurable function a
t by a
t(s)  a
t+1(s). The
rst equality follows from the denition of W and because Theorem 2
guarantees (18), the second equality follows from the denition of f;g and
simple algebra; the third equality follows from the denitions of f, '; and
a: The weak inequality follows from the fact a is a feasible solution
for the problem PP'(;) with initial conditions (x
1;s1) and that this
program achieves V'(;)(x
1;s1) at its maximum; and the last equality
follows from Theorem 2 and (18).
To show  (22) we construct a sequence a+ that consists of the optimal
choice for SPP for initial conditions (x;s) in the initial period, but
subsequently is followed by the optimal choices for PP'(;(x;;s)) for
initial conditions (x
1;s1). To dene a+ formally we explicitly denote by
(a(x;;s);(x;;s)) a solution to SPP for given initial conditions
(x;s) and we let
a
+
0 (x;;s) = a
0(x;;s)
a
+
t (x;;s) = a
t 1(x
1;'(; (x;;s);s); s1)
for all (x;;s) and t  1. Also, we let x+ be the corresponding sequence
of state variables.
In what follows, we simplify again notation and we go back to denoting a
t(x;;s)
by a
t, (x;;s) by , and a
+
t (x;;s)(st) by a
+
t ; then, we have:
W(x;;s) = f(x;;s)(a) + g(a)0
 f(x;;s)(a+) + g(a+)0
= h0(x; a
+
0 ; s) + h1(x; a
+
0 ; s)
+E
2
4
l X
j=0
'(; )j
Nj X
t=0

t h
j
0(x
+
t+1; a
+
t+1; st+1) j s
3
5
= h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s)
+E[W(x
1;'(; );s1)js];
18where the rst equality has been argued before, the rst inequality follows
from the fact that a+(x;;s) is a feasible allocation in SPP for initial
conditions (x;s) { but a(x;;s) is a solution of the max part to SPP at
(x;s). The second equality just applies the denition of f and g; the last
equality follows because a+ is optimal for PP'(;(x;);s) given initial
conditions (x
1;s1) from period 1 onwards and because Theorem 2 insures
that (18) holds.
Notice that for this step of the proof it is crucial that we use SPP in order
to obtain a recursive formulation. The rst inequality above only works
because we are considering a saddle point problem. Indeed, the a+ se-
quence (that reoptimizes in period t = 1) is feasible for SPP because this
problem does not impose the forward looking constraints in t = 0. The
sequence a+ would not be feasible in the original problem PP; because
by reoptimizing at period t = 1 the forward-looking constraints at t = 0
would be typically violated.
This ends the proof of (22).
To show that W satises SPFE we now prove that the right side of SPFE is
well dened at W and that (a
0;) is a saddle point of the right side of
(19) or, formally, that (a
0;) 2 	W (x; ; s):
We rst prove that a
0 solves the max part of the right side of SPFE. Given any
e a 2 A; p(x;e a;s)  0, letting e a
t(st)  a
t 1(`(x; e a; s0); '(; ); s0)((st))
for t  1; the denition of e a
t; and (18) give the rst equality in
h0(x; e a; s) + h1(x; e a; s) + E[W(`(x; e a; s0); '(; ); s0)js]
= h0(x; e a; s) + h1(x; e a; s)
+E
2
4
l X
j=0
'(; )j
Nj X
t=0

t h
j
0(e x
t+1; e a
t+1; st+1) j s
3
5
= f(x;;s)(e a
) + g(e a
)0
 f(x;;s)(a) + g(a)0
= W(x;;s)
the second equality follows by denition, and the inequality because (a;)
solves the max part of SPP while the third equality follows from (18).
Now we can combine this with (22) to obtain that for all feasible e a 2 A
h0(x; e a; s) + h1(x; e a; s) + E[W(x
1; '(; ); s0)js]
 h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s) + E[W(x
1; '(; ); s0)js]
implying that a
0 solves the max part of the right side of the SPFE.
19A similar argument shows that  solves the min part: for any e  2 R
l+1
+ let
now
h0(x; a
0; s) + e h1(x; a
0; s) + E[W(x
1; '(; e ); s0)js]
 h0(x; a
0; s) + e h1(x; a
0; s) +
+E
2
4
l X
j=0
'(; e )j
Nj X
t=0

t h
j
0(x
t+1; a
t+1; st+1) j s
3
5
= f(x;;s)(a) + e  g(a)0
 f(x;;s)(a) +  g(a)0
= W(x;;s)
= h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s) + E[W(`(x; a
0; s0); '(; ); s0)js]
where the inequality follows from the fact that shifting the policies one
period back of the plan a is a feasible plan for the PP'(; e ) problem with
initial conditions (x
1;s0) and that W(x
1; '(; e ); s0) is the optimal value
of PP'(; e ), the second inequality follows because (a;) is a saddle
point of SPP and the equalities follow from denitions, Theorem 2 and
(22).
Therefore  solves the min part of the right side of SPFE.
Therefore (a
0;) is a saddle point of the right side of SPFE, this implies the
rst equality in
min
0
max
a2A
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[W(x0; 0; s0)js]g
= h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s) +  E[W(x
1; '(; ); s0)js]
= W(x;; s)
and the second equality comes, again, from (22). This proves that W satises
SPFE.
The argument used in the proof of Theorem 3 can be iterated a nite number
of times to show the underlying recursive structure of the PP formulation. If
PP has a unique solution fa
tg
1
t=0 at (x;s); then by Theorem 1 there is a SPP
at (x;s) with solution (fa
tg
1
t=0 ;); which in turn denes a PP'(;) prob-
lem. As it has been seen in the proof of Theorem 3, fa
tg
1
t=1 solves PP'(;)
at (`(x; a
0; s);s1) and by Theorem 1 there is a 
1 such that (fa
tg
1
t=1 ;
1)
solves SPP'(;) at (`(x; a
0; s);s1). In turn, fa
tg
1
t=2 solves PP'(2)(;) at
(`(2)(x; a
0; s);s1) where '(2)(; )  '('(; ); 
1; s1) and `(2)(x; a
0; s) 
`(`(x; a
0; s); a
1; s1): Similarly, let '(n+1)(; )  '('(n)(; ); 
n; sn); then
by recursively applying the argument of the proof of Theorem 3 we obtain the
following result.
20Corollary 3.1. (Recursivity of PP). If PP satises the assumptions of
Theorem 1 and has a unique solution fa
tg
1
t=0 at (x;s); then, for any
(t;x
t;st),

a
t+j
	1
j=0 is the solution to PP'(t)(;) at (x
t;st); where 
is the minimizer of SPP at (x;s):
The value function has some interesting properties that we would like to
emphasize. First, notice that
W(x;;s) = f(x;;s)(a) + g(a)0
= f(x;;s)(a)
= E0
l X
j=0
Nj X
t=0

tjh
j
0(x
t; a
t; st);
therefore, if fa
tg
1
t=0 at (x;s) is uniquely dened, then W has a unique repre-
sentation
W(x;;s) =
l X
j=0
j!
j(x;;s)
= !(x;;s)
where, for j = 0;:::k;!j(x;;s)  E0
P1
t=0 
th
j
0(x
t; a
t; st), and, for j = k +
1;:::l;!j(x;;s)  h
j
0(x
0; a
0; s0): Similarly, the value function of SPP'(;)
at (x
1;s1); x
1 = `(x; a
0; s); satises
W(x
1; '(; ); s1)  '(; )!(x
1; '(; ); s1):
This representation not only has an interesting economic meaning { for example,
as a `social welfare function,' with varying weights, in problems with intertem-
poral participation constraints { but is also very convenient analytically. In
particular, this reprensentation shows16 that W is convex and homogenous of
degree one in , with W(x;0;s) = 0; for all (x;s)17. In addition, the fol-
lowing Corollary to Theorem 3 also shows that W satises what we call the
saddle-point inequality property SPI. Lemmas 1 and 2 below show how these
properties are extended to general W functions satisfying SPFE.
A function W(x;;s) =
Pl
j=0 j!j(x;;s) satises the saddle-point inequal-
ity property SPI at (x; ; s) if and only if there exist (a;) satisfying
h0(x; a; s) + e h1(x; a; s) +  E['(; e )!(x0; '(; ); s0)js]
 h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E['(; )!(x0; '(; ); s0)js]: (23)
 h0(x; e a; s) + h1(x; e a; s) +  E['(; )!(e x0; '(; ); s0)js]; (24)
16See Lemma 2A in the Appendix B.
17A function which is convex, homogeneous of degree one and nite at 0, is also called a
sublinear function (see Rockafellar, 1981, p.29).
21for any e  2 R
l+1
+ and (e a; e x0) satisfying the technological constraints at (x; s);
that is, in SPI the multiplier minimization is taken in relation to the optimal
continuation values.
Corollary 3.2. (SPP =)SPI). Let W(x;;s)  V(x;s) be the value of
SPP at (x;s), for an arbitrary (x; ; s), then W(x;;s) =
Pl
j=0 j!
j(x;;s)
satises SPI:
Proof: We only need to show that (23) is satised, but this is immediate from
the following identities
f(x;;s)(a) = h0(x; a
0; s) +  E
2
4
k X
j=0
j!
j(x
1; '(; ); s1)js
3
5
g(a)0 =  [h1(x; a
0; s) +  E[!(x
1; '(; ); s1)js]];
and the denition of SPP at (x;s); that is, for any e  2 R
l+1
+ ,
h0(x; a; s) + e h1(x; a; s) +  E['(; e )!(x0; '(; ); s0)js]
= f(x;;s)(a) + e g(a)0
 f(x;;s)(a) + g(a)0
= h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E['(; )!(x0; '(; ); s0)js]

We now show that, under fairly general conditions, programs satisfying
SPFE are solutions to SPP at (x;s). More formally,
Theorem 4 (SPFE =) SPP) Assume W, satisfying SPFE, is continuous
in (x;) and convex and homogeneous of degree one in . If the SP policy
correspondence 	W; associated with W, generates a solution (a;)(x;;s),
where (a)(x;;s) is uniquely determined, then (a;)(x;;s) is also a so-
lution to SPP at (x;s):
Notice that the assumptions on W are very general. In particular, if W(x;;s)
is the value function of SPP at (x;s) (i.e. W(x;;s)  V(x;s)) then (as
Lemma 2A in Appendix B shows) it is convex and homogeneous of degree one
in  and, if A2 - A5 are satised it is continuous and bounded in (x;).
The only `stringent condition' is that (a)(x;;s) must be uniquely determined,
which is the case when W is concave in x and A6s is satised ( see Corollary
4.1.).
Before proving these results, we show that, as we have seen for W, convex
and homogeneous functions W satisfying SPFE have some interesting proper-
ties, which are used in the proof of Theorem 4. First, without loss of generality
(see F2 and F3 in Appendix C), we can express the recursive equation (19) in
the form
!d(x;;s) = h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s)
+ E
h
'(; )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
; (25)
22where !d(x;;s) = W(x;;s); and the vectors !d and !d
0
are (partial) di-
rectional derivatives, in ;of W(x;;s) and W(x0; '(; ); s0); respectively.
Therefore, the SPFE saddle-point inequalities take the form
h0(x; a; s) + e h1(x; a; s) +  E
h
'(; e )!d
0
(x0; '(; e ); s0)js
i
 h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E
h
'(; )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
(26)
 h0(x; e a; s) + h1(x; e a; s) +  E
h
'(; )!d
0
(e x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
; (27)
for any e  2 R
l+1
+ and (e a; e x0) satisfying the technological constraints at (x; s):
Second, as we show in Lemma 1, there is an equivalence between this SPFE
property and the saddle-point inequality property, SPI, which substitutes (26)
for
h0(x; a; s) + e h1(x; a; s) +  E
h
'(; e )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
 h0(x; a; s)+h1(x; a; s)+ E
h
'(; )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
. (28)
Third, as we show in Lemma 2, if in addition (a;)(x;;s) is uniquely
determined, then W is dierentiable in : Alternatively, if W is not dierentiable
in 0, then dierent choices of !d
0
can result in dierent solutions and the union
of all these dierent solutions are the solutions to the saddle point problem,
given by (28) and (27).
Lemma 1 (SPI () SPFE). If W(x;;s) is convex and homogeneous of de-
gree one, then (26) is satised if and only if (28) is satised. Furthermore,
the inequality (28) is satised if and only if the following conditions are
satised, for j = 0;:::;l;
h
j
1(x; a
0; s) +  E
h
!d
0
j (x

1; 
1; s1)js
i
 0 (29)
j
h
h
j
1(x; a
0; s) +  E
h
!d
0
j (x

1; 
1; s1)js
ii
= 0: (30)
Proof of Lemma 1: That SPI =) SPFE follows from F4 (see Appendix C).
With respect to W(x0; '(; ); s0); F4 takes the form:
'(; e )!d
0
(x0; '(; e ); s0)  '(; e )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0);
therefore (28) together with this latter inequality results in the following
inequalities, which show that (26) is satised whenever (28) is satised:
h0(x; a; s) + e h1(x; a; s) +  E
h
'(; e )!d
0
(x0; '(; e ); s0)js
i
 h0(x; a; s) + e h1(x; a; s) +  E
h
'(; e )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
 h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E
h
'(; )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
23To see that SPFE =) SPI, let
G(x;a;s)(;)  h0(x; a; s)+h1(x; a; s)+ E
h
'(; )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
;
and
F(x;a;s)(;)  h0(x; a; s)+h1(x; a; s)+ E
h
'(; )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
;
Then (26) reduces to G(x;a;s)(;)  G(x;a;s)(;) and (28) to F(x;a;s)(;) 
F(x;a;s)(;). Since G(x;a;s)(;) = F(x;a;s)(;); the above in-
equalities (??) show that, if f(x;a;s)(;) 2 @F(x;a;s)(;); for all
  0; then
G(x;a;s)(;)   G(x;a;s)(;)  F(x;a;s)(;)   F(x;a;s)(;)
(   )f(x;a;s)(;);
that is, f(x;a;s)(;) 2 @G(x;a;s)(;).
Let g(x;a;s)(;) be an extreme point of @G(x;a;s)(;), since G(x;a;s)(;)
is homogenous of degree one in , by F2 9 k  ! with G dierentiable
at k and rG(x;a;s)(yk;)  ! g(x;a;s)(;): By homogeneity of degree
zero of !d
0
(x0; 0; s0) with respect to 0
rG(x;a;s)(k;) = h1(x; a(x; ; s); s)+ E
h
!d
0
(x0(x; ; s); '(;k); s0)js
i
:
Given the dierentiability of rG(x;a;s)(yk;) at k; continuity18 of ' and !d
0
;
implies that
g(x;a;s)(;) = h1(x; a(x; ; s); s)+ E
h
!d
0
(x0(x; ; s); '(;); s0)js
i
;
and, therefore, g(x;a;s)(;) 2 @F(x;a;s)(;) { in fact, it is also an
extreme point of @F(x;a;s)(;). This shows that @F(x;a;s)(;) =
@G(x;a;s)(;); which, in turn, implies the equivalence between (26)
and (28).
Finally, the proof of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is standard. First, necessity
of (29) follows from the fact that   0 is nite, which will not be the
case if, for some j = 0;:::;l;
h
j
1(x; a
0; s) +  E
h
!d
0
j (x

1; 
1; s1)js
i
< 0:
To see necessity of (30), let 
j
(i) = j, if j 6= i, and i
(i) = 0; then (28)
results in:
h0(x; a; s) + 
(i)h1(x; a; s) +  E
h
'(; 
(i))!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
18The continuity of !d0
; is given, for example, by Theorem 4F (& Corollary 4G) in Rock-
afellar (1981).
24 h0(x; a; s)+h1(x; a; s)+  E
h
'(; )!d
0
(x0; '(; ); s0)js
i
,
which, together with (29), implies that
0  j
h
h
j
1(x; a
0; s) +  E
h
!d
0
j (x

1; 
1; s1)js
ii
 0:
To see, that (29) and (30) imply (28), suppose they are satised and there
exists a e   0, for which (28) it is not, then it must be that
e 
h
h1(x; a
0; s) +  E
h
!d
0
(x

1; 
1; s1)js
ii
< 
h
h1(x; a
0; s) +  E
h
!d
0
(x

1; 
1; s1)js
ii
= 0;
which contradicts (29)
Lemma 2. If (a;)(x;;s) is generated by 	W(x; ; s) and (a)(x;;s) is uniquely
dened then W(x
t;
t;st) is dierentiable with respect to 
t; for every
(x
t;
t;st);with (x
t;
t) realized by19 (a;)(x;;s) :
Proof of Lemma 2: By (30) the recursive equation (25) simplies to
!d(x;;s) = h0(x; a; s) +  E
2
4
k X
j=0
j!d
0
j (x0;  + ); s0)js
3
5,
Assume, for the moment, that (a;)(x;;s) is uniquely determined. By
recursive iteration, it follows that
!d(x0;0;s0) = h0(x0; a
0; s0)
+ E0
2
4
k X
j=0
j

h
j
0(x
1; a
1; s1) + !d
00
j (x
2;  + 
0 + 
1); s2)

js0
3
5
= h0(x0; a
0; s0) +  E0
2
4
k X
j=0
j
1 X
t=1

th
j
0(x
t; a
t; st)js0
3
5;
therefore, uniqueness of (a;)(x;;s) implies: i) !d(x; ; s) is uniquely
dened: !d(x; ; s) = !(x; ; s)  rW(x; ; s); which, in turn, implies
that W(x;;s) is dierentiable, and ii) !j(x; ; s) = E0
P1
t=0 
th
j
0(x
t; a(x
t; 
t; st); st);
for j = 0;:::k (with (x
0; 
0; s0)  (x; ; s); x
t+1 = `(x
t; a(x
t; 
t; st); st),
and 
t+1 =  + (x
t; 
t; st)), and !j(x; ; s) = h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s),
for j = k + 1:::l
19That is, (x
0;
0)  (x;);x
t+1 = `(x
t;a
t;st+1) and 
t+1 = '(
t;
t):
25Given (a)(x;;s), suppose now
 
a; e 

(x;;s) is also generated by 	W(x; ; s).
Both saddle-point paths must have the same value (see Lemma 3A in
Appendix B); in particular, following the same recursive argument:
!d(x0;0;s0) = h0(x0; a
0; s0) +  E
2
4
k X
j=0
j!d
0
j (x0;  + e 
); s0)js
3
5
= h0(x0; a
0; s0) +  E0
2
4
k X
j=0
j
1 X
t=1

th
j
0(x
t; a
t; st)js0
3
5;
which proves the dierentiablity of W with respect to , even when
()(x;;s) is not uniquely determined (i.e. there may be kinks in the
Pareto frontier)
An immediate, and important, consequence of Lemma 2 is the following
result:
Corollary: If (a)(x;;s) is uniquely dened by 	W(x; ; s), from any initial
condition (x;;s); then the following (recursive) equations are satised:
!j(x; ; s) = h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s) +  E[!j(x0(x; ; s); 0(x; ; s); s0)js],
if j = 0;:::;k; and (31)
!j(x; ; s) = h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s) if j = k + 1;:::;l: (32)
Furthermore, (a)(x;;s) is uniquely dened by 	W(x; ; s) whenever W(; ; s)
is concave and A6s is satised.
Notice that, in proving Lemma 2, uniqueness of the solution paths has im-
plied uniqueness of the value function decomposition: W = !. This unique
decomposition has implied the recursive equations (31) and (31). Uniqueness
of the value function decomposition is equivalent to the dierentiability of the
value function. In fact, once it has been established that the value function is
dierentiable, one can obtain equations (31) and (31) as a simple application of
the Envelope Theorem. For example, equation (31) is just20:
@jW(x; ; s) = h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s)+ E[@jW(x0(x; ; s); 0(x; ; s); s0)js].
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 4, where these recursive equations (31)
and (31) play a key role.
Proof (Theorem 4): By Lemma 2, there is a unique representation W(x; ; s) =
!(x; ; s). To see that solutions of SPFE satisfy the participation con-
straints of SPP, we use the rst-order-conditions (29) and 30), as well
20We use the standard notation @jW(x; ; s) 
@W(x;;s)
@i
, and also !j(x; ; s) 
@jW(x; ; s)
26as the recursive equations of the forward-looking constraints (31) and 32)
of the previous Corollary. As in the proof of Lemma 2, equation (31) can
be iterated to obtain
!j(x; ; s) = E0
"
1 X
t=0

th
j
0(x
t; a
t; st)js
#
; if j = 0;:::;k: (33)
Following the same steps for any t > 0 and state (x
t; 
t; st), equation(32)
and (33) together with the inequality (29) show that the intertemporal
participation constraints in PP { and therefore in SPP { are satised;
that is,
Et
Nj+1 X
n=1

n h
j
0(x
t+n; a
t+n; st+n)+h
j
1(x
t; a
t; st)  0; ; t  0; j = 0;:::;l
(34)
Now, to see that solutions of SPFE are, in fact, solutions of SPP
we argue by contradiction. Suppose there exist a program fe atg
1
t=0 ; and
fe xtg
1
t=0, e x0 = x; e xt+1 = `(e xt; e at; st+1), satisfying the constraints of SPP
with initial condition (x;s) and such that
h0(x; e a0; s) + h1(x; e a0; s)
+ E
2
4
k X
j=0
 
j + j
1 X
n=1

t h
j
0(e xt; e at; st) +
l X
j=k+1
jh
j
0(e x1; e a1; s1)js
3
5
> h0(x; a
0; s) + h1(x; a
0; s)
+ E
2
4
k X
j=0
 
j + j
1 X
n=1

t h
j
0(x
t; a
t; st) +
l X
j=k+1
jh
j
0(x
1; a
1; s1)js
3
5:
(35)
The following string of equalities and inequalities, which we explain at the
27end, contradict this inequality,
h0(x; a
0; s) + 
0h1(x; a
0; s)
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= h0(x; a
0; s) + 
0h1(x; a
0; s) +  E[
1!(x
1; 
1; s1)js] (36)
 h0(x; e a0; s) + 
0h1(x; e a0; s) +  E[
1!(e x1; 
1; s1)js] (37)
= h0(x; e a0; s) + 
0h1(x; e a0; s)
+  E[
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1;s1); s1) + (e x1; 
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1;s1);s2)js]
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Notice that the rst equality (36) is just uses the value function decomposi-
tion, the other two equalities (38) and (42) are simple expansions of the of the
saddle-point value paths (i.e., of (25)) and in these expansions equations (31)
and (31) play a key role. Inequalities (37) and (39) follow from the maximality
property of SPFE. Inequalities (40) and (41) require explanation. Inequality
(40) follows from one of the properties of convex and homogeneous of degree
one functions (i.e. F4: b !(b )  b !(); see Appendix), given that (40) is sim-
ply 0(e x1; 
1;s1)!(e x2; 0(e x1; 
1;s1)  0(e x1; 
1;s1)!(e x2; 
1;s2): Inequal-
ity (41) follows from applying the slackness inequality (29), as well as equations
(32) and (33) to the plan generated by SPFE in state (e x2; 
1;s2) (i.e. to
fa
t(e x2; 
1;s2)g
1
t=2); these inequalities are needed to show that such plan satis-
es the corresponding SPP constraints (34); that is,
h
h
j
1(e x1; e a1; s1) + !j(e x2; 
1;s2)
i

280; j = 0;:::;l: Finally, since the equality (42) is simply the equality (38) after one
iteration, repeated iterations result in the last inequality (43), which contradicts
(35).
It only remains to show that the inf part of SPP is also satised. Reasoning
again by contradiction, suppose there exist a e   0 such that
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(44)
Using the value function decomposition representation, this inequality can also
be expressed as
e  [h1(x; a(x; ; s); s) +  E[!(x0(x; ; s); 0(x; ; s); s0)js]]
< (x; ; s)[h1(x; a(x; ; s); s) +  E[!j(x0(x; ; s); 0(x; ; s); s0)js]];
but the rst-order-conditions (29) and (30) require that (28) is satised, i.e.
e  [h1(x; a(x; ; s); s) +  E[!(x0(x; ; s); 0(x; ; s); s0)js]]
 (x; ; s)[h1(x; a(x; ; s); s) +  E[!j(x0(x; ; s); 0(x; ; s); s0)js]] = 0
which contradicts (44)
Corollary to Lemma 2 implies the following Corollary to Theorem 4:
Corollary 4.1. Assume W, satisfying SPFE, is continuous in (x;), convex
and homogeneous of degree one in ; concave in x and that A6s is satised.
If (a;)(x;;s) is generated by 	W(x; ; s) then (a;)(x;;s) is also a
solution to SPP at (x;s):
5 DSPP and the contraction mapping
In this Section we show how our main results {Theorems 3 and 4{ can also
be obtained by applying the Contraction Mapping Theorem to the Dynamic
Saddle-Point Problem, corresponding to SPFE. This Section provides more
general sucient conditions to obtain a solution to the original problem PP
starting from SPFE. While these conditions are satised whenever the condi-
tions of Theorem 4 are satised, they help to better understand the passage
SPFE!PP and, in particular, they show how the standard method of value
function iteration extends to our saddle-point problems and, therefore, that com-
puting solutions to our original PP does not require special computational
29techniques. Furthermore, it also shows the interest of using the W = ! repre-
sentation in computing recursive contracts (i.e. taking ! as the starting vector
valued function) and how, in contrast with the `promise keeping' approach to
solving contractual problems, `promised values' are not part of the constraints,
but an outcome of the recursive contract21.
We rst dene some spaces of \value" functions
Mb =fW : X  R
l+1
+  S ! R
i)W(; ; s) is continuous, and W(; ; s) bounded, whenkk  1;
ii)W(x; ; s) is convex and homogeneous of degree oneg
and
Mbc =fW 2 Mb and
iii)W(; ; s) is concaveg:
Mb is a space of continuous, bounded functions (in x), and convex and ho-
mogenous of degree one (in )22, while Mbc is the subspace of concave functions
(in x). Both spaces are normed vector spaces with the norm
kWk = supfjW(x;;s)j : kk  1;x 2 X;s 2 Sg:
We show in Appendix D (Lemma 6A) that they are complete metric spaces;
therefore, suitable spaces for the Contraction Mapping Theorem.
Since, whenever W satises (ii) it can be represented as W(x; ; s) =
!(x; ; s) (see Lemma 4A), it is convenient to dene the corresponding spaces
of functions:
Mb =f! : X  R
l+1
+  S ! Rl+1 s.t., for j = 0;:::;l;
i)!j(; ; s) is continuous, and !j(; ; s) bounded, when kk  1
ii)!j(x; ; s) is convex and homogeneous of degree zerog
and
Mbc =f! 2 Mb s.t., for j = 0;:::;l;
iii)!j(; ; s) is concaveg:
Notice that ! 2 M uniquely denes a function W 2 M, given by W  !,
but W 2 M does not uniquely dene a Rl+1 valued function ! 2 M; it does
when, in addition, W is dierentiable in  (see Appendix C)23.
As we have seen in Section 424, when W(x;;s) = V(x;s) is the value
of SPP, with initial conditions (x;s), then W(x;;s) =
Pl
j=0 j!
j(x;;s)
21We further discuss the `promise keeping' approach in Section 6.
22Without loss of generality, we could also require that W(x;0;s) < 1 and then replace
(ii) by W(x; ; s) is sublinear (see footnote 12).
23M denotes either Mb or Mbc.
24See also Lemma 2A in Appendix B.
30with W 2 Mb, whenever A2 - A4 are satised (and W 2 Mbc if in addition
A5 - A6 are satised); furthermore, ! 2 M is unique whenever (a)(x;;s) is
uniquely dened.
Given a function ! 2 M, and an initial condition (x;;s); we can dene the
following Dynamic Saddle Point Problem:
DSPP
inf
0
sup
a
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[0!(x0; 0; s0)js]g
s.t. x0 = `(x; a; s); p(x;a; s)  0
and 0 = '(; );
To guarantee that this problem has well dened solutions we make an interiority
assumption:
A7b: For any (x;s) 2 X  S, there exists an e a 2 A; satisfying p(x;a; s) > 0,
such that, for any 0 2 R
l+1
+ ;k0k < +1; and j = 0;:::;l : h
j
1(x;e a;s) +
E

!j(`(x; e a; s0);0;s0)js

> 0:
Notice that A7b is satised, whenever A7 is satised and 0!(`(x; e a; s0);0;s0)
is the value function of SPP(`(x;e a;s0);0;s0). In general, A7b is not a restrictive
assumption in the class of possible value functions if the original problem has
interior solutions. Nevertheless, an assumption, such as A7b is needed when
one takes DSPP(x;;s) as the starting problem. This is a relatively standard
minmax problem, except for the dependency of ! on '(; ): The following
proposition shows that it has a solution. Obviously, solutions to DSPP(x;;s)
satisfy SPFE. . An immediate consequence of A7b, is the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Assume A4 and A7b and let ! 2 Mb. There exist a B > 0, such
that if (a(x;;s);(x;;s)) is a solution to DSPP at (x;;s), then
k(x;;s)k  B kk.
Proof: Denote by (a;)  (a(x;;s);(x;;s)) the solution to DSPP at
(x;;s), and let e a be the interior solution of A7b, then
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[0!(`(x; a;s); '(; ); s0)js]
= h0(x; a; s) +  E
2
4
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a;s); '(; ); s0)js
3
5
+  [h1(x; a; s) +  E[!(`(x; a;s); '(; ); s0)js]]
= h0(x; a; s) +  E
2
4
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a;s); '(; ); s0)js
3
5
 h0(x; e a; s) +  E
2
4
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; e a; s); '(; ); s0)js
3
5
+  [h1(x; e a; s) +  E[!(`(x; e a;s); '(; ); s0)js]]
31By assumption,
(=kk)h0(x; a; s)+ E
2
4
k X
j=0
(j=kk)!j(`(x; a;s); '((=kk); (=kk)); s0)js
3
5
is uniformly bounded ( A4 and ! 2 Mb imply that there is uniform bound
for the max value), while if (j=kk) > 0 then
(j=kk)
h
h
j
1(x; e a; s) + E[!j(`(x; e a;s); '((=kk); (=kk)); s0)js]
i
> 0;
therefore, there must be a B > 0 such that kk  B kk
Proposition 2. Let ! 2 Mbc and assume A1-A6 and A7b. There exists
(a;) that solves DSPP(x;;s): Furthermore if A6s is assumed, then
a(x;;s) is uniquely determined.
Proof: It is a relatively standard proof of existence of an equilibrium, based on
a xed point argument; see Appendix D.
The following Corollary to Theorem 3, is a simple restatement of the theorem
in terms of the Dynamic Saddle Point Problem
Corollary 3.3. (SPP(x;s) =) DSPP(x;;s) ). Assume that SPP at (x;s)
has a solution (a; ) with value V(x;s) =
Pl
j=0 j!
j(x;;s), then
(a
0;) solves DSPP(x;;s).
When DSPP(x;;s) has a solution, it denes a SPFE operator T : M  !
M given by
(TW)(x;;s) = min
0
max
a
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E[W(x0; 0; s0)js]g
s.t. x0 = `(x; a; s); p(x;a; s)  0
and 0 = '(; );
When W  !, with ! 2 M, and DSPP(x;;s) uniquely denes the values
h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s); j = 0;:::;l; then T denes a mapping, T : M  ! M,
given by
(T!j)(x; ; s) = h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s)+ E[!j(x0(x; ; s); 0(x; ; s); s0)js],
(45)
if j = 0;:::;k; and
(T!j)(x; ; s) = h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s), if j = k + 1;:::;l: (46)
Two remarks are in order. First, as already said, notice that (T!j) correspond
to the `promise keeping' approach to solving contractual problems but in our
32approach (T!j) is not a constraint: it is an outcome. Second, a xed point
of T does not imply a xed point of T when `the planner' is indierent to T
reallocations (e.g. i = j, i(T!i)+ j(T!j) = constant) resulting in multiple
(indeterminate) continuation values (for i and j)25
Proposition 3. Assume DSPP has a solution, for any ! 2 M and (x;;s);
then T : M ! M is a well dened contraction mapping. Let W =
T(W) and W = !, if in addition the solutions a(x; ; s) to DSPP
are unique, then ! = T(!) is unique.
Proof: The rst part follows from showing that Blackwell's suciency condi-
tions for a contraction are satised for T (see Lemmas 7A to 10A in
Appendix D), the second part from the denition of T.
Our last Theorem, Theorem 5, wraps up our suciency results and is, in
fact, a Corollary to Theorem 4. It shows how, starting from a Dynamic Saddle-
Point Problem and a corresponding well dened Contraction Mapping resulting
in a unique value function, one obtains the solution to our original problem
PP. The previous Propositions 2 and 3 provide conditions guaranteeing that
the assumptions of Theorem 5, regarding T, are satised.
Theorem 5 (DSPP(x;;s) =) SPP(x;s)). Assume T : M ! M has a unique
xed point !. Then the value function W(;x;s) = !(x;;s) is the
value of SPP at (x; s) and the solutions of DSPP dene a saddle-point
correspondence	, such that if (a;) is generated by 	 from (x; ; s),
then (a;) solves SPP at (x; s) and a is the unique solution to PP
at (x; s):
Proof: By assumption SPFE is satised. The proof of Theorem 4 is based
on having a unique representation W(;x;s) = !(x;;s) which, in
that proof, is given by Lemma 2. In Theorem 5 such a unique represen-
tation is assumed, which implicitly also means to assume that the values
h
j
0(x; a(x; ; s); s)j = 0;:::;l are uniquely determined, which in fact is
all what is needed in the proof of Theorem 4.
6 Related work
Precedents of our approach can be found in Epple, Hansen and Roberds (1985),
Sargent (1987) and Levine and Currie (1987), who introduced lagrange mul-
tipliers as co-state variables in linear-quadratic Ramsey problems. Similarly,
recent studies of optimal monetary policy in sticky price models have included
lagrange multipliers as co-states. Often, the reason given for including these
past multipliers as co-states is the observation that past multipliers appear in
25Messner and Pavoni's `counterexample' is one of these cases of `ats in the Pareto frontier',
when one only considers the T map and not the T map; see Marimon, Messner and Pavoni
(2010).
33the rst-order-conditions of the Ramsey problem. Our work provides a formal
proof that, with standard assumptions, co-state past multipliers deliver the op-
timal solution in a general framework, encompassing a larger class of models
with forward-looking constraints.
The pioneer work of Abreu, et al. (1990) -APS, from now on,- character-
izing sub-game perfect equilibria, shows that past histories can be summarized
in terms of promised utilities. Earlier related work was by Green (1987) and
Thomas and Worral (1988). This approach has been widely used in macroe-
conomics26. Some applications are by Kocherlakota (1995) in a model with
participation constraints, Cronshaw and Luenberger (1994) in a dynamic game.
Also, as in the earlier work Kydland and Prescott (1980), Chang (1998) and
Phelan and Stacchetti (1999) study Ramsey equilibria using promised marginal
utility as a state variable, and they note the analogy of their approach with
APS's.
Both APS and our approach have in common that, starting from non-
recursive problems, allow to obtain optimal solutions (obviously, the same solu-
tions) where forward-looking constraints have a recursive structure. In relatively
simple problems (e.g., convex problems of full information and low dimension-
ality, in terms of state variables and number of forward-looking constraints) the
two approaches can be seen as mirrors of each other. Nevertheless, there is a
conceptual dierence which sets these two approaches further apart as more
complex problems are analyzed: our state (including the co-state ) is prede-
termined, while promised-utilities { as co-state variables { are not; furthermore,
in the APS approach, in taking future promised-utilities as choice variables,
the recursive structure of forward-looking constraints must be taken as `promise
keeping' constraints, while in our approach we obtain this recursive structure
as a result (see, Subsection 2.1)27.
As it is well known promised utilities in the APS approach have to be re-
stricted to lie in a set where the continuation problem is well dened, otherwise
algorithmic computations break down. The set of feasible promised utilities
is not known beforehand, it can only be characterized numerically, often lead-
ing to very complicated calculations. Whenever there are several natural state
variables the set of feasible promised utilities is a function of the natural state
variables and the problem of nding the set of feasible utilities is daunting.
Considerable progress has been made either by improving algorithms or by re-
dening the problem at hand28, but the issue of constraining promised utilities
(or marginal utilities in a Ramsey problem) is always present.
One key advantage of our approach is that the continuation problem is given
by PP0; and it is easy to nd standard assumptions guaranteeing that this
problem has a solution for any co-state 0  0; in fact, the set of feasible co-
states is known beforehand, it is simply the positive orthant. The diculties
26Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) provides an excellent introduction, and reference, to most
of this recent work.
27We only provide a summary discussion of the contrast between both approaches, see
Marcet (2008) for more details.
28See, for example, Abraham and Pavoni (2005) or Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin (2003).
34associated with computing a set of co-states for which the continuation problem
is well dened are absent.
A second advantage lies in the dimensionality of the decision vector. In the
APS approach the planner has to decide at t the utility promised at all possible
states in t + 1: If the underlying exogenous state variable can take Ns possible
values the planner has to decide on at least Ns controls at t: Most applications of
APS constrain themselves to assuming that the exogenous variable is binomial
(say, it can be "high" or "low"), but if exogenous variables can take many values
a high-dimensional decision vector has to be solved for. Again, there are ways
of dealing with this, but it is no doubt an added diculty. By contrast, in our
approach the dimensionality of the decision variable is independent of Ns.
An additional issue is that the initial conditions for the state variables in our
approach are given from the outset, namely 0 = 1 and j = 0 for j  1; while
in the promised utility approach the promised utility in the rst period has to
be solved for separately. It is well known that for this it is needed that the
Pareto frontier is downward slopping, otherwise the computations can become
very cumbersome.29
Finally, an interesting -but not exclusive- feature of our approach is that the
evolution of  often helps to directly characterize the behavior of the model. For
example, in models with participation constraints the 's allow to interpret the
behavior of the model as changing the Pareto weights sequentially depending
on how binding the participation constraints become. In Ramsey type models
the behavior of the 's is associated with the commitment technology and the
role that budget constraints play in the objective function of the planner. We
have discussed these interpretations in Section 3. Also, our approach facilitates
to identify cases where despite the presence of forward-looking constraints the
co-state variables do not need to be introduced in the model.30
The APS approach has some strengths over our approach. For example, it
allows for the characterization of all feasible paths (not only the constrained-
ecient) and it naturally applies to models with private information or models
with multiple solutions. However, these initial advantages are also being over-
come. Sleet and Yeltekin (2010) and Mele (2010) have extended our approach
to address moral hazard problems. In problems with multiple (locally unique)
solutions, it is also possible to nd other feasible paths using our approach
by changing the objective function. However, as the example of Messner and
Pavoni (2004) shows, there are problems where optimal paths are bound to
have a continuum of solutions (i.e. when the constrained-ecient Pareto fron-
tier has ats). We have maintained the assumption of (local) uniqueness in
this paper; nevertheless, Marimon, Messner and Pavoni (2011) have recently
29Even with two agents and a downward slopping Pareto frontier, as in Kocherlakota (1996),
one may be interested in nding the ecient allocation that ex-ante gives the same utility to
both agents. While this is trivial with our approach (just give the same initial weights in the
PP problem), becomes very tricky with the APS approach since the `right promise' must be
made to determine the initial conditions.
30This can be the case, for example, in Cooley, Quadrini and Marimon (2004) and Anag-
nostopoulos, C arceles-Poveda and Marcet (2011).
35shown that there is a natural extension of our approach to solve problems with
non-uniqueness 31.
Many applications of our approach can be found in the literature, although
it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them in detail. This seems to be
testimony of the convenience of using our approach, specially in the presence
of intertemporal participation constraints with natural state variables such as
capital (as in Subsection 3.1) or rst-order Euler equation constraints with bonds
as natural state (as in Subsection 3.2).
Perhaps most interesting is that the approach here can be used as an in-
termediate step in solving models that go beyond the pure formulation of PP:
For example, a second generation of models considers endogenous participation
constraints, as in the non-market exclusion models of Cooley et al. (2004), Ma-
rimon and Quadrini (2011), and Ferrero and Marcet (2005). In these models
the functions h that appear in the incentive constraints are endogenous, they
depend on the optimal or equilibrium solution, and the approach of this paper
is often used as an intermediate step, dening the underlying contracts. This
allows the study of problems where the outside option is determined in equili-
brum as in models of debt renegotiation and long-term contracts. Furthermore,
the work of Debortoli and Nunes (2010) extends our approach to study models
of partial commitment and political economy, and the work of Marimon and
Rendhal (2011) extend is to study models where agents can behave strategi-
cally with respect to their participation constraints, as in dynamic bargaining
problems.
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that a large class of problems with implementability constraints
can be analysed using an equivalent recursive saddle-point problem. This saddle-
point problem obeys a saddle point functional equation, which is a version of
the Bellman equation. This approach works for a very large class of models
with incentive constraints: intertemporal enforcement constraint, intertemporal
Euler equations in optimal policy policy or regulation design, etc. This means
that a unied framework can be provided to analyse all these models. The key
feature of our approach is that instead of having to write optimal contracts
as history-dependent contracts one can write them as a stationary function of
the standard state variables together with additional co-state variables. These
co-state variables are { recursively { obtained from the Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with the intertemporal incentive constraints, starting from pre-specied
initial conditions. This simple representation also provides economic insight into
the analysis of various contractual problems; for example, with intertemporal
31Marimon, Messner and Pavoni (2011) show how the results presented here can be applied
when the co-state is extended with the `last non-negative multiplier'. Cole and Kubler (2010)
also provide a solution for the non-uniqueness case. Their approach involves a mix of our
approach and of the APS approach; they provide a solution for the two-agent case with
intertemporal participation constraints.
36participation constraints it shows how the (Bethamite) social planner changes
the weights assigned to dierent agents in order to keep them within the social
contract; in Ramsey optimal problems it shows the cost of commitment to the
benevolent government.
We have provided here the rst complete account of the basic theory of re-
cursive contracts. Nevertheless, we had already expounded most of the elements
of the theory in our previous work (in particular, Marcet and Marimon (1988
& 1999)), which has allowed others to built on it. Many applications are al-
ready found in the literature, showing the convenience of our approach, specially
when natural state variables are present. Useful extensions are already available
encompassing a larger set of problems than the ones considered here.
378 Authors' Aliations
Albert Marcet, London School of Economics and CEP,
E-mail: a.marcet@lse.ac.uk
and
Ramon Marimon, European University Institute and Universitat Pompeu
Fabra - BarcelonaGSE,
Via delle Fontanelle 20, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy;
Telephone: +39-055-4685809, Fax: +39-055-4685894,
E-mail: ramon.marimon@eui.eu
38APPENDIX
Appendix A (Proof of Proposition 1)
The proof of Proposition 1 relies on the following result:
Lemma 1A. Assume A1-A6 and that S is countable, then
i) B(x;s) is non-empty, convex, bounded and (L1; L1) closed; therefore it is
(L1; L1) compact
ii) Given d 2 R; the set

a 2 A : f(x;;s)(a)  d
	
is convex and (L1; L1)
closed
The proof of Lemma 1A builds on three theorems. First, the Urysohn
metrization theorem stating that regular topological spaces with a count-
able base are metrizable32. Second, the Mackey-Arens theorem stating
that dierent topologies consistent with the same duality share the same
closed convex sets; in our case, the duality is (L1; L1) and the weak-
est and the strongest topology consistent with such duality; namely, the
weak-star, (L1; L1) and the Mackey (L1; L1) . Third, the Alaoglu
theorem stating that norm bounded (L1; L1) closed subsets of L1 are
(L1; L1) compact33.
Proof:
Assumptions A2, and A4 - A6 imply that B(x;s) is convex, and closed under
pointwise convergence. Since, by assumption S is countable, Urysohn
metrization theorem guarantees that B(x;s) is, in fact, (L1; L1) closed.
Assumptions A3 and A4 imply that B(x;s) is bounded in the kk

1 norm
as needed for compactness, according to the Alaoglu theorem.
Assumptions A5 and A6 imply that B(x;s) and the upper contour sets fa 2 A : f(a)  dg;
are convex and, together with the previous assumptions (A2, and A4),
Mackey closed and, therefore, (L1; L1) closed34
Proof of Proposition 1: As in Bewley (1991), the central element of the proof
follows from the Hausdor maximal principle and an application of the
nite intersection property35. Let Pd =

a 2 B(x;s) : f(x;:s)(a)  d
	
,
32See Dunford and Schwartz (1957) p. 24. in our case the metric we use is given by

1(a; b) =
1 X
n=0
n sup
sn2Sn
j an(s)   bn(s) j :
33See Schaefer (1966) p. 130 and p. 84, respectively.
34See Bewley (1972) for a proof of the Mackey continuity expected utility, without assuming
S being countable.
35See, Kelley (1955) p. 33-34. for the Hausdor principle and the Minimal principle, and
p. 136 for the theorem stating that "a set is compact if and only if every family of closed sets
which has a the nite intersection property has a non-void intersection."
39then by Lemma 1A , Pd is (L1; L1) closed. By the interiority assumption
of Proposition 1, for d low enough, it is non-empty. In fact, we can consider
the family of sets fPd : d 2 Dg for which Pd 6= ?; where D  R. The sets
Pd are ordered by inclusion; in fact, if d0 > d then Pd0  Pd and every nite
collection of them has a non-empty intersection (i.e., fPd : d 2 Dg satises
the nite intersection property), but then by compactness of B(x;s) any
family of subsets of fPd : d 2 Dg -say, fPd : d 2 B  Dg- has a non-empty
intersection and, by inclusion, there is Pb d = \fPd : d 2 B  Dg 6= ?. In
particular, there is Pd = \fPd : d 2 Dg 6= ? which -as the the minimal
principle states- is a minimal member of the family fPd : d 2 Dg. It fol-
lows that if a 2 Pd then f(x;:s)(a)  f(x;:s)(a) for any a 2 B(x;s):
Furthermore, if strictly concavity is assumed then Pd must be a single-
ton, otherwise convex combinations of elements of Pd will form a proper
closed subset of Pd contradicting its minimality
Appendix B (Some Properties of W)
Lemma 2A. Let W(x;;s)  V(x;s) be the value of SPP at (x;s), for an
arbitrary (x; ; s), then
i) W(x;;s) is convex and homogeneous of degree one;
ii) if A2- A4 are satised W(;;s) is continuous and uniformly bounded,
and
iii) if A5 and A6 are satised W(;;s) is concave.
Proof: i) follows from the fact that, for any  > 0, f(x;:s)(a) = f(x;:s)(a).
To see this, let (;a) satisfy SFPE, i.e.
f(x;:s)(a) + g(a)0
 f(x;:s)(a) + g(a)0
 f(x;:s)(a) + g(a)0;
for any  2 R
l+1
+ and a 2 B0(x;s). Then (;a) satises
f(x;:s)(a) + g(a)0
 f(x;:s)(a) + g(a)0
 f(x;:s)(a) + g(a)0;
for any  2 R
l+1
+ and a 2 B0(x;s): ii) and iii) are straightforward; in par-
ticular, ii) follows from applying the Theorem of the Maximum (Stokey,
Lucas and Prescott,1989, Theorem 3.6) iii) follows from the fact that the
constraint sets are convex and the objective function concave.
Lemma 3A: If the inf sup problem, SPFE at (x; ; s); has a solution then
the value of this solution is unique.
40Proof: It is a standard argument: consider two solutions to the right side
of SPFE at (x; ; s), (e a;e ) and (b a;b ), then repeated application of the
saddle-point condition implies:
h0(x; e a; s) + e h1(x; e a; s) + E[W(`(x; e a; s0);'(; e ); s0)js]
 h0(x; b a; s) + e h1(x; b a; s) + E[W(`(x; b a; s0);'(; e ); s0)js]
 h0(x; b a; s) + b h1(x; b a; s) + E[W(`(x; b a; s0);'(; b ); s0)js]
 h0(x; e a; s) + b h1(x; e a; s) + E[W(`(x; e a; s0);'(; b ); s0)js]
 h0(x; e a; s) + e h1(x; e a; s) + E[W(`(x; e a; s0);'(; e ); s0)js]
therefore the value of the objective at both (e a;e ) and (b a;b ) coincides 
Appendix C (Some Properties of convex homogeneous functions)
To simplify the exposition of these properties let F : Rm
+ ! R continuous,
convex and homogeneous of degree one. The subgradient set of F at y,
denoted @F(y), is given by
@F(y) =

z 2 Rm j F(y0)  F(y) + (y0   y)z for all y0 2 Rm
+
	
:
The following facts, regarding F, are used in proving Lemmas 1 and 2:
F1. If F is convex, then it is dierentiable at y if, and only if, @F(y) consists of
a single vector; i.e. @F(y) = frF(y)g; where rF(y) is called the gradient
of F at y:
F2. If F is convex and nite in a neighborhood of y, then @F(y) is the convex
hull of the compact set
fz 2 Rm j 9 yk  ! y with F dierentiable at yk and rF(yk)  ! zg:
F3. Lemma 4A (Euler's formula). If F is convex and homogeneous of de-
gree one and z 2 @F(y) then F(y) = yz.
F4. Lemma 5A. If F is convex and homogeneous of degree one, for any pair 
f; b f

; if fd(y) 2 @F(y) and fd(b y) 2 @F(b y), then b yfd(b y)  b yfd(y).
F1 is a basic result on dierentiability of convex functions (see, Rockafellar,
1981, Theorem 4F, or 1970, Theorem 25.1). F2 is a very convenient charac-
terization of the subgradient set of a convex function (see Rockafellar, 1981,
Theorem 4D, or 1970, Theorem 25.6). We now provide a proof of the last two
facts.
Proof of Lemma 4A: Let z 2 @F(y), then for any  > 0; F(y)   F(y) 
(y   y)z, and, by homogeneity of degree one: (   1)F(y)  (   1)yz.
If  > 1 this weak inequality results in: F(y)  yz; while if  2 (0;1) in
F(y)  yz36
36Notice that this does not imply that F is linear, which requires that F( y) =  F(y):
41Proof of Lemma 5A: To see F4 notice that if fd(y) 2 @F(y) and fd(b y) 2
@F(b y); by convexity, homogeneity of degree one, and Euler's formula:
F(b y) = b yfd(b y) and
F(b y)  F(y) + (b y   y)fd(y)
= yfd(y) + b yfd(y)   yfd(y) = b yfd(y):
Appendix D (Proof of Propositions 2 and 3)
Proof of Proposition 2: Given the assumptions of Proposition 2, for any
(x;;s); and  2 R
l+1
+ , let
F(x;;s)() = argsup
a
8
<
:
h0(x; a; s) +  E
2
4
k X
j=0
j!j(x0; 0; s0)js
3
5
9
=
;
s.t. x0 = `(x; a; s); p(x;a; s)  0
and 0 = '(; );
and h
j
1(x;a;s) + E

!j(x0;0;s0)js

 0; j = 0;:::;l (47)
Since this is a standard maximization problem of a continuous function on
a compact set, there is a solution a(x;;s;) 2 F(x;;s)(). Furthermore,
given that the constraint set is convex and has a non-empty interior (by
A2 and A7b), there is an associated multiplier vector; let j(x;;s;)
be the multiplier corresponding to (47), for j. In particular, by Lemma 3,
(x;;s;) 2 G(x;;s)(a); where
G(x;;s)(a) = arg inf
f0:kkBkkg
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) +  E['(; )!(x0; '(; ); s0)js]g
s.t. x0 = `(x; a; s); p(x;a; s)  0
The rest of the proof is a trivial application of the Theorem of the Maxi-
mum (e.g. Stokey et al. (1989), p. 62) and of Kakutani's Fixed Point The-
orem (e.g. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), p.953). First notice that h0(x; a; s)+
 E
hPk
j=0 j!j(x0; 0; s0)js
i
is continuous in a and, by A2, A4 and the
denition of Mbc; G
(x;;s)() is also continuous. Second, let A(x;s) 
fa 2 A : p(x;a; s)  0g, by A2 and A3 A(x;s) is compact and by A5 is
convex, while 	()  f  0 : kk  B kkg is trivially compact and
convex. Therefore, F(x;;s) : 	() ! A(x;s) and G
(x;;s) : A(x;s) !
	() are upper-hemicontinuous, non-empty and convex-valued correspon-
dences, jointly mapping a convex and compact set, 	A(x;s), in itself; by
Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem there is a xed point (a;) which is a
solution to DSPP(x;;s). Furthermore, F(x;;s)() is a continuous function,
when A6s is assumed
Lemma 6A. M is a nonempty complete metric space.
42Proof: That it is non-empty is trivial. Except for the homogeneity property,
that every Cauchy sequence fWng 2 Mbc converges to W 2 Mbc sat-
isfying i), iii), and the convexity property ii), follows from standard
arguments (see, for example, Stokey, et al. (1989), Theorem 3.1 and
Lemma 9.5). To see that the homogeneity property is also satised, for
any (x; ; s) and  > 0,
jW(x; ; s)   W(x; ; s)j
= jW(x; ; s)   Wn(x; ; s) + Wn(x; ; s)   W(x; ; s)j
 jW(x; ; s)   Wn(x; ; s)j + jWn(x; ; s)   W(x; ; s)j
! 0

Lemma 7A. Assume A2 - A6 and A7b. The operator T maps Mbc into
itself.
Proof: First, notice that by Proposition 2, given W 2 Mbc, TW is well de-
ned. The correspondences   : X ! X and  : R
l+1
+ ! R
l+1
+ ; dened by
 (x)(;s)  fx0 2 X : x0 = `(x; a; s); p(x;a; s)  0; for some a 2 Ag and
()(x;s) 

0 2 R
l+1
+ : 0 = '(; ); for some  2 R
l+1
+
	
;
are continuous and compact-valued (by A2, A3 and A5, and the deni-
tion of '; respectively) and, as in the proof of Proposition 2, by continuity
of the objective function, it follows that TW(; ; s) is continuous, and
given A3 and A4, and the boundedness condition on W, it follows that
TW also satises (i).To see that the homogeneity properties are satised,
let (a; ) satisfy
(TW)(x; ; s) = h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; ; s0)
then, for any  > 0
(TW)(x; ; s) = [h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; ; s0)]
Furthermore,
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; 
0
; s0)
= 
h
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; 
0
; s0)
i
To see that SPFE is satised, let   0, 0 = '(; ) and a 2 A(x;s),
x0 = `(x; a; s0), then
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; 0; s0)
= 

h0(x; a; s) + 
 1h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; 0
 1; s0)

 
h
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; 
0
; s0)
i
 
h
h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x0; 
0
; s0)
i
43It follows that,
(TW)(x; ; s) = h0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(x; 
0
; s0)
= (TW)(x; ; s)
Finally, since W 2 Mbc, it is straightforward to show that TW is concave
in x (by A5 and A6), and convex in 
Lemma 7A (monotonicity) Let c W 2 M and f W 2 M be such that c W  f W,
then (Tc W)  (Tf W).
Proof Fix (; x; s), then for any 0 satisfying 0 = '(; )  0, for a given
  0,
max
a2A(x;s)
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + Ec W(`(x; a; s);0; s0)g
 max
a2A(x;s)
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + Ef W(`(x; a; s);0; s0)g
It follows that
min
0
max
a2A(x;s)
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + Ec W(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)g
 min
0
max
a2A(x;s)
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + Ef W(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)g

Notice that if W 2 Mbc and r 2 R, (W +r)(x; ; s) = (! +r)(x; ; s) =
!(x; ; s) + rkk.
Lemma 8A (discounting) Assume A4 and A7b. For any W 2 Mb, and
r 2 R+, T(W + r)  TW + r.
Proof First notice that, for any (x; ; s) and   0,
max
a2A(x;s)
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + E(W + r)(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)g
= max
a2A(x;s)
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0) + rk'(; )kg
= max
a2A(x;s)
fh0(x; a; s) + h1(x; a; s) + EW(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)g + rk'(; )k;
Now, given (x; ; s) and a 2 A(x;s); denote by +(a) the solution to the
following problem
min
f0:kkBkkg
(
h0(x; a; s) + E
Pk
j=0 j(!j + r)(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)
+
Pl
j=0 j
h
h
j
1(x; a; s) + E(!j + r)(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)
i
)
= h0(x; a; s) + E
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; +(a)); s0)
+ +(a)

h1(x; a; s) + E!(`(x; a; s);'(; +(a)); s0)

+ r

'(; +(a))


44and let (a) be the solution to
min
f0:kkBkkg
(
h0(x; a; s) + E
Pk
j=0 j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)
Pl
j=0 j
h
h
j
1(x; a; s) + E!j(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)
i
)
= h0(x; a; s) + E
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; (a)); s0)
+ (a)[h1(x; a; s) + E!(`(x; a; s);'(; (a)); s0)];
therefore,
h0(x; a; s) + E
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; +(a)); s0)
+ +(a)

h1(x; a; s) + E!(`(x; a; s);'(; +(a)); s0)

+ r
 '(; +(a))
 
 h0(x; a; s) + E
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; (a)); s0)
+ (a)[h1(x; a; s) + E!(`(x; a; s);'(; (a)); s0)] + rk'(; (a))k:
Piecing things together (denoting, as usual, by a  a(x;; s) and  
(x;; s)); that is,   (a)), we have:
T(W + r)(x;; s)
= min
0
max
a2A(x;s)
(
h0(x; a; s) + E
Pk
j=0 j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)
+
Pl
j=0 j
h
h
j
1(x; a; s) + E!j(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)
i
)
 h0(x; a; s) + E
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; ; s0)
+  [h1(x; a; s) + E!(`(x; a; s);'(; ); s0)] + rk'(; )k
= h0(x; a; s) + E
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; ; s0) + rk'(; )k
 h0(x; a; s) + E
k X
j=0
j!j(`(x; a; s);'(; ; s0) + r(1 + B)kk
By homogeneity, without loss of generality we can choose an arbitrary
 6= 0, such that: kk  (1 + B) 1. The above inequalities show that
T(W + r)  T(W) + r
Lemma 9A (Contraction property): The argument is the standard Black-
well's argument. We show that the contraction property is satised. Let
W; c W 2 Mbc.
45Notice that W  c W +

 W   c W

 , then using the results of Lemmas 7A
and 8A,
TW  T(c W +
 
W   c W
 
)  T(c W) + +
 
W   c W
 
);
reversing the roles of W and c W, we obtain that

 TW   Tc W

   

 W   c W

 ;
therefore, T is a contraction mapping
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